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ABSTRACT 
Though successive generations of digital technology have become increasingly powerful in the past twenty 
years, digital democracy has yet to realize its potential for deliberative transformation. The undemocratic 
exploitation of massive social media systems continued this trend, but it only worsened an existing problem 
of modern democracies, which were already struggling to develop deliberative infrastructure independent of 
digital technologies. There have been many creative conceptions of civic tech, but implementation has lagged 
behind innovation. This essay argues for implementing one such vision of digital democracy through the 
establishment of a public corporation. Modeled on the Corporation for Public Broadcasting in the U.S., this 
entity would foster the creation of new digital technology by providing a stable source of funding to nonprofit 
technologists, interest groups, civic organizations, government, researchers, private companies, and the 
public. Funded entities would produce and maintain software infrastructure for public benefit. The 
concluding sections identify what circumstances might create and sustain such an entity. 
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1 Introduction: The Stages of Electronic Democracy 
This special issue asks us to look back on the recent history of democracy in the digital age, and both of us 
have worked on different aspects of digital democracy over the past two decades. Gastil (2000) embraced the 
inverse opportunity to speculate on the future prospects for deliberative engagement online. As a scholar of 
conventional deliberative settings, such as public forums, Gastil argued for the necessity of sustaining face-
to-face contact in pluralist democracies, but recognized that the efficiency and unique affordances of digital 
tools forced offline engagement to justify its continued existence. Meanwhile, Davies began a project focused 
on identifying and reducing barriers to participation in neighborhood improvement initiatives, and argued for 
“the development of an online environment for expanding community democracy” (Davies et al. 2002).  
 
Since the early 2000s, the theory and practice of face-to-face deliberation has developed considerably—even 
producing its own adaptable technologies, such as the “minipublic” (Grönlund, Bachtiger, and Setälä 2014) 
	 2	
that is most widely used in the form of Deliberative Polls (Fishkin 2018). These random samples of citizens 
exercise various forms of influence. Minipublics, in particular, have formulated referendums on policy 
controversies (Warren and Pearse 2008), created voting aids on ballot measures to educate fellow voters 
(Gastil, Knobloch, Reedy, Henkels, et al. 2018), and exercised authority over political redistricting (Ancheta 
2014). Researchers following these and other deliberative institutions have found that they generally fulfill 
their promise as a means of promoting better judgment, democratic civic attitudes, and future political 
engagement (Pincock 2012). Though the institutions cited above merely dot the political landscape, each has 
attained a measure of recognition and is likely to spread—perhaps in the same way that participatory 
budgeting has expanded beyond Latin America to cover the globe (Dias 2018). 
 
Meanwhile, digital democracy designers have been busy creating and promoting their own visions of online 
deliberation and democratic decision making (see e.g. Davies and Gangadharan, 2009). To justify our 
whimsical subtitle, we see these as proceeding through four stages.  
 
The first stage could be called Early Visions of Electronic Democracy (~1970s and 1980s). Optimistic 
conceptions of electronic democracy saw cable television and home terminals as the advent of a new age in 
which citizens might meet virtually to offer a reflective judgment on the issues of the day (e.g., Henderson 
1970, Leonard et al. 1971, Ohlin 1971, Becker and Slaton 2000).  
 
The second stage was that of the Public Internet (~1990s and early 2000s). The transformation of the Defense 
Department-funded Arpanet into the public Internet ushered in a new era of many-to-many communication. 
Democratic reformers hoped it would empower every citizen to be part of an extended, “virtual community” 
while accessing a global library of knowledge and to publish their own reflections for all to see (e.g., 
Rheingold 1993; for a critique, see Hindman 2009).  
 
The third stage has been the era of Social Media (~Mid-2000s to the present). Technologies that jointly 
formed “Web 2.0” (O’Reilly 2007) made possible a social Web plus mobile smart phone apps that allow 
massive numbers of users to share their own rich media content (e.g., Youtube), to engage in social 
networking (e.g., Facebook), to collaborate (e.g., Wikipedia and Google Docs), and to share data across-
platforms (e.g., feeds and embeds) (Davies & Mintz 2009). Theorists of this more advanced era of digital 
technology have hoped it might restore our depleted social capital, by expanding social networks and 
rebuilding citizens’ trust in each other and their shared institutions (Wells 2015).  
 
Each of these three stages built on past efforts to expand the participatory possibilities of technology but 
could not overcome significant barriers or limitations for most users. Stage 1 was predicated on making 
broadcast and cable television a two-way medium, and it manifested mostly as ideas and prototypes. Stage 2 
was the first realization of two-way broadcasting available to large numbers of people, but it offered limited 
capabilities to the average user and remained inaccessible to most people. In Stage 3, technological and 
organizational infrastructure made it possible for more than half of the world’s population—and the vast 
majority of U.S. teens and adults—to use digital technology on a regular basis. It has enabled people to share 
personal information and opinions with large numbers of others, including complete strangers.  
 
The social media platforms most widely used in Stage 3, however, are commercial services built and 
maintained by private corporations under a profit motive that is often at odds with users’ desires for privacy. 
At best, commercial social media tools such as Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter are built neither to help nor 
harm democratic engagement. Instead, a need for continuous advertising revenue drives their design—
irrespective of what that means for democracy (McNamee 2019; Wu 2017). Moreover, the network and data 
dominance of (and the software patents held by) these platforms serve as barriers to entry for new tools, 
including noncommercial social media platforms and those designed more specifically for public engagement 
(Dwyer 2014; Taplin 2017). 
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That brings us to what we believe is a fourth stage. “Episode IV” represents a “new hope” in the e-democracy 
saga.1 This includes a search for powerful counterweights to the economic power of commercial digital 
media. We argue that such a rebalancing could only come from stable government funding and establishing 
the legal status of users’ civic identities. Thus, we call this possible future as the Public Software stage.  
 
In imagining how this stage might unfold, we draw inspiration from the history of public broadcasting in the 
United States, which proceeded from the first noncommercial television stations in the 1950s to the Public 
Broadcasting Act of 1967 (Hilmes 2003). As the Corporation for Public Broadcasting funds noncommercial 
radio and television for the public benefit (i.e., PBS, NPR, noncommercial and community stations, and 
noncommercial productions), a Corporation for Public Software (CPS) would fund noncommercial software. 
This includes code, databases, and the organizations that produce them for the benefit of governments and 
civil society. Though there are aspects of the public broadcasting model upon which we might improve, and 
there are certainly differences between software and broadcasting, we believe this analogy is instructive and 
provides a general approach that we can build on in this century.  
 
Through the two main examples in this essay, we show how a public corporation for software could spur the 
creation, adaptation, and coordination of information and communication technology for public purposes. In 
the realm of government (a.k.a. “civic tech”), a CPS could link together new or existing civic tools in a way 
that harnesses the real power of social media, while promoting a more deliberative kind of talk, rendering 
sensible collective judgments that democratic governments would willingly follow (Gastil and Richards 
2017). For civil society, a CPS could support digital tool creation, adaptation, and improvement to bolster 
social relationships, renew community organizations, and enhance participatory designs (Davies & Mintz 
2009; Davies et al. 2009; Davies et al. 2012).  
 
A cynic might view our vision of this fourth stage as a rehash of its forerunners. We believe, however, that a 
complex and ongoing system to support public-interest software could generate democratic deliberation more 
effectively than even its face-to-face counterparts could. Before making that argument, however, we begin 
by clarifying the underlying problems that our proposed initiative aims to address. 
2 Assessing the Social Media Era: What Happened and What 
Should Be Done?  
As we write in early 2019, there is widespread discontentment about the effects of commercial social media 
on democracy in the U.S. (McChesney 2013; McNamee 2019; Taplin 2017; Vaidhyanathan 2018; Wu 2017). 
Facebook, in particular, has come in for heavy criticism for its role in the 2016 Brexit and Trump electoral 
victories and its uses by people who have committed mass violence in Myanmar and New Zealand 
(McNamee 2019). A common narrative running through many of these critiques is that the largest and most 
powerful Internet companies (Google, Facebook, and Amazon) have deceived users into sharing their data 
with third parties because there are huge profits to be made in doing so. This business model has been called 
“surveillance capitalism” (Zuboff 2019).  
 
In this narrative, companies use scientific means to keep users on their sites, draw information out of them, 
and then use that information to push products and ideas on behalf of paying advertises. An important aspect 
of this system is users remaining oblivious. For example, Roger McNamee has asserted that the popular 
augmented reality game Pokémon GO was created as a spin-off of Google to conduct a massive social 
surveillance and control experiment (Grimes 2019). 
 																																																								
1	For	an	interesting	discussion	of	George	Lucas’s	political	intentions	and	the	perspective	on	democracy	of	the	Star	Wars	saga,	to	which	our	subtitle	alludes,	see	O’Connor	(2016).	
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Likewise, Facebook has shared millions of users’ personal information with political manipulators, who used 
the data to target users with disinformation (“fake news”) to influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential election 
(McNamee 2019; Vaidhyanathan 2018). Commercial Internet companies have been the objects of various 
other critiques, such as the charge that they promote racism through crude algorithms (Noble 2018; O’Neil 
2017), cause widespread depression and social anxiety among young people (Twenge 2018), undermine 
social intimacy (Turkle 2011), alter brain chemistry and processes in unhealthy ways (Greenfield 2015), and 
decimate the kind of journalism that is essential to a well-functioning democracy (McChesney 2013; Ingram 
2018; Taplin 2017).  
2.1 Building on a Groundswell of Concern 
The mass realization that it might not be good for democracy to filter much of our political discourse through 
the algorithms of targeted advertising platforms has come surprisingly late—more than a decade into the 
Social Media era, as we defined it in section 1. Nonetheless, this spreading realization provides an opportunity 
for a coordinated political response that would have seemed much more challenging a few years ago. Those 
who embrace the idea of Public Software could seize this moment by mobilizing support for it and working 
on a long-term strategy.  
 
At the same time, social media and digital politics must bear only some of the responsibility for democracy’s 
present troubles. The 2016 U.S. Presidential election involved a confluence of powerful social media, 
political bots, and propaganda posing as news. Market forces brought this reality into existence (O’Neil 
2017), but deeper problems in American democracy made our system vulnerable to manipulation and 
degradation long before the era of Social Media. 
 
As Emily Parker (2017) argued in a New York Times op-ed, “Social media platforms magnify our bad habits, 
even encourage them, but they don’t create them. Silicon Valley isn’t destroying democracy—only we can 
do that.” Though democratic politics have always been contentious, digital life has made us more tribal in 
our politics, as our information streams become personalized to reinforce biases and deprive us of common 
points of reference (Sunstein 2017). Yet, even if recent events had not thrown the continued viability of US. 
democracy into such doubt, we would still have good reasons to seek software infrastructure more 
specifically geared toward enhancing our civic, community, and personal lives. 
 
The deliberative critique of currently existing democracy predates the era that we have called the Public 
Internet. Modern deliberative scholarship emerged in the 1980s, principally as a critical perspective on 
conventional politics. In brief, deliberative theory “affirms the need to justify decisions made by citizens and 
their representatives” (Gutmann and Thompson 2009 p. 3). In small group settings, whether face-to-face or 
online, democratic deliberation involves carefully analyzing problems and considering alternative solutions 
while maintaining equality and respect among participants. On larger social scales, deliberative systems 
include a robust public sphere, dense civic networks, independent news media, cultural traditions of both 
dialogue and disagreement, and related institutions and practices.  
 
Even digital skeptics, such as Sunstein (2017), can see a way toward a more deliberative politics. Sunstein 
glimpses on the horizon not less online activity but a richer information environment, which draws citizens 
into deliberative spaces and spontaneous encounters with diverse opinions. There is halting movement toward 
building a more deliberative and democratic digital commons (Noveck 2018), but these efforts lack 
coordination and push against powerful obstacles (Howard 2015).  
 
The reasons to build public software in the U.S. are thus both negative and reactive to recent events, on one 
hand, as well as positive and of long standing on the other. We wish to stop the threats that commercial-
driven social media pose to our democratic culture (a negative reason), but also to build a healthier civic and 
community life than we have ever had. Positive motivations like those have spurred various efforts to 
innovate over the past 20 years, encouraged by the surprising success of free and open source software (e.g., 
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Linux, Apache, Firefox, Wordpress, and Drupal) and the very democratically operated Wikipedia, powered 
by the MediaWiiki software which is licensed under the GNU General Public License v2+.  
2.2 Lessons from Facebook’s Success 
A story often told about Facebook is that Mark Zuckerberg—whether because of naiveté or malfeasance—
personally chose the model for social exchange that would control Facebook users’ lives. In reality, 
Zuckerberg was just one of many programmers creating software in the mid-2000s and trying to attract users 
to his social media platform. Others have done so as well under various, and sometimes quite different, 
business models. The world ended up using Facebook not because Zuckerberg decided users should do so, 
but because users decided, collectively and one-by-one, to use Zuckerberg’s platform rather than dozens of 
alternatives. If Zuckerberg is guilty of crimes against democracy, then he has had 2.5 billion accomplices—
the people around the globe who accepted Facebook’s terms of service and posted their data on its site.  
 
The Facebook business model was the victor in a winner-take-all battle among competitors such as 
Friendster, MySpace, and Diaspora. Facebook won with users in part because its real name policy gave the 
site at least the feel of grounding in real life (McNamee 2019). Its design and functionality were attuned to 
what users cared about most—their lives and personal relationships, people they are curious about, how they 
are doing compared to others, and being liked. Facebook won with advertisers because it rolled out ads slowly 
at first, using venture capital investment to build a huge base of loyal users who trusted that the site would 
show them relevant and interesting information every time they logged in (Wu 2017).  
 
Equally importantly, Facebook won the battle for labor among the most skilled programmers and designers. 
Like most workers, these individuals went where money was to be made. In the mid-2000s, it was not yet 
obvious that this would determine the platform we would all be using. After all, open source software projects 
in which programmers contributed their labor without remuneration had been enormously successful and had 
created Wikipedia, one of the world’s most successful websites under an ethic of volunteer sharing and a 
legal environment that was friendly to open source development (Webber 2004, Wales 2007). 
 
For whatever reasons, the volunteer-based, democratically run, nonprofit and noncommercial model of the 
Wikimedia Foundation did not take hold when it came to online social networks. In retrospect, the outcome 
of the competition to build the world’s online social network seems to show this. The huge resources required 
to support over a billion users actively uploading content required an investment best suited to the way 
Facebook was built, at least in the early years of the Social Media era. If true, this has consequences for how 
we think about the creation of software in the public interest: A large amount of deliberate investment may 
be required to address something more collective than the sum total of individuals’ daily desires. 
2.3 Can Regulation and Antitrust Enforcement Turn the Tide? 
While Facebook may have achieved its early advantage just by being better than other sites at giving users 
what they wanted, it is also plausible that Facebook turned this advantage into a long-term monopoly by 
violating antitrust law with impunity. That is the position taken by the legal scholar Tim Wu (2018), who 
advocates that Facebook be targeted with antitrust litigation to break up its control over the previously 
competing platforms it acquired (i.e., Instagram and WhatsApp). Many others have also argued for antitrust 
enforcement against Facebook, Google, and Amazon, as well as regulation of how they operate (e.g., 
Jankowicz 2018, Keen 2018; McNamee 2019; Taplin 2017). Zuckerberg himself has said he would welcome 
more Federal regulation (Zuckerberg 2019). 
 
From the point of view of democracy, however, we think it is important to see the inherent limitations of 
these approaches. At best, they appear to be trying to return us to a time before social media were available 
for widespread political manipulation. But even in that recent era, Americans supported an invasion of Iraq 
on the mistaken idea that Saddam Hussein was somehow responsible for 9/11. This happened because people 
	 6	
had been poorly served by the media of their time. Such delusions have appeared often in democracies, well 
before the arrival of social media (Bennett, Lawrence, and Livingston 2008).  
 
We are not opposed to regulating large Internet companies to temper their potential for abuse, nor to breaking 
them up using antitrust laws where applicable. Nevertheless, we think that the biggest obstacle toward digital 
democratic innovation has not been a lack of will to regulate and limit, but rather has been a lack of ambition 
in the scope and design of civic reforms. Collectively, we have too readily taken a lack of public capacity for 
democratic participation as a given, without exploring the possibilities for building a stronger democratic 
culture through strategic means. Modern U.S. society has allowed its democratic culture to be shaped by 
forces that exist for non-democratic purposes, which may obscure the public’s capacity for meaningful civic 
engagement.  
 
To imagine how to reinvigorate civic life online, we present two visions for software that could be sustained 
through public investment. The first is a recent vision of civic tech, aimed at making government work better 
for its citizens (Gastil & Meinrath 2018, Gastil & Richards 2017). The second is a software project that has 
been ongoing since 2003, but whose full aspiration as a tool for civil society has not been realized (Davies et 
al. 2009, Davies & Mintz 2009).  
3 The Democracy Machine: A Shiny New Civic Internet 
To those doubtful of the prospects for digital democratic reform, we point toward the example of Spain 
(Noveck 2018; Peña-López 2017; Smith 2018). Barcelona and other municipalities adopted the open source 
software Consul (ConsulProject.org) to create civic engagement opportunities. Madrid’s customization of 
this tool went far enough to warrant its own name: DecideMadrid. This multi-faceted tool can host everything 
from participatory budgeting exercises to debates and policy consultations, with substantial numbers of 
Spanish citizens using it as an effective tool to get issues on city agendas or to advocate for particular policies.  
 
Non-governmental organizations have embraced digital technology, from networking sites to petitioning and 
fundraising tools, such as Change.org (Gordon and Mihailidis 2016). Governments have been slower to 
develop online public spaces, with most taking on non-controversial tasks, such as providing digital forms or 
crowdsourcing infrastructure repairs (Noveck 2015).  
  
No level of government, however, has built a sufficiently powerful and robust online public engagement 
system, let alone one that draws on the complementary capacities of the public sector, non-governmental 
organizations, and researchers. From the earliest days of the Internet, civic innovators have dreamed of digital 
democracy, but the private sector has outpaced public investment in civic tech. The most ambitious private 
ventures to date (Brigade, iCitizen, and NationBuilder) aim to replicate partisan dynamics online. The most 
visible nonpartisan sites either rely on a single philanthropist (Ballotpedia) or have chronic funding problems 
(Project Vote Smart). We also include in this mix community spaces, such as Nextdoor and Discord, and 
group toolkits, such as Asana, Loomio, and Slack. Each of these examples gives us hope for a sustainable 
and deliberative digital public sphere. Without active government intervention, however, we are more likely 
to become reliant on privately curated and inegalitarian public spaces. 
 
The alternative we propose would establish an interlinked system to exchange data across different public 
services and civic sites (Gastil and Meinrath 2018; Gastil and Richards 2017). This would not entail building 
a new platform. Rather, it would make existing (and future) tools interoperable and sustain their ongoing 
development through public funding. In this system, citizens would have the ability to move easily between 
civic games, prediction markets, deliberative surveys, and discussion forums because the system would 
connect each of those tools in a more intuitive way. Just as a Facebook identity seamlessly links data and 
services within and beyond that particular platform, so could a unique identifier do the same for a person’s 
civic experiences online. This would introduce a privacy challenge akin to digital health records. Access 
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control would need to be nuanced and granular at a level that grants users full control over their own data, 
which could foster heightened digital literacy and training for lay citizens. 
 
To see how this would work, consider this scenario. In an integrated digital commons, your career as an 
engaged citizen might start with a few clicks on a mobile device. Spotting and reporting illegal dumping on 
a city street prompts an invitation to brainstorm on improving the city’s waste disposal system. That draws 
you into a chat on urban planning priorities, where you get to talk with city officials. You end up collaborating 
with fellow residents, who you met through these events, to draft a petition to revitalize a neighborhood park. 
All the while, your local government keeps acknowledging your suggestions, noting when problems get 
addressed, and offering thoughtful explanations when it cannot act on your advice. 
 
With irony in his heart, Gastil dubbed this confluence of civic tech a “Democracy Machine.” For those more 
visually inclined, Figure 1 summarizes the way this machine might operate. At four junctures in this model, 
we denote where digital civic technology (“civic tech”) plays a central role, just as the Consul system does 
for its users. It operates as an ongoing effort, with steady feedback loops theorized to build up both citizens’ 
political self-confidence and the legitimacy of the public institutions that have ceded a measure of power and 
influence to those same citizens. 
	
Figure 1: A feedback-loop model showing the causal paths operational in an online public consultation process 
Inside this Democracy Machine, gamified interaction elements and gamified activities could motivate 
participants to help sustain the system’s democratic features and deliberative process. For example, an in-
game currency could give participants more say over what issues are the next priority for deliberation. If 
participants could obtain that currency through bringing in new players from underrepresented census blocks, 
this could be a way to sustain the diversity of the user base. Likewise, currency bonuses for constructive 
disagreement during discussions could encourage not only civility but also substantive clash during 
deliberations. 
 
While commercially-driven software thus far has been most successful in prompting users to talk about 
politics, governments have the advantage of being a stable and definitive source of community identity, which 
is especially important when users’ online choices influence public policy. A problem for online democracy 
is that interest groups have a clear motivation to manipulate policy outcomes, such as by creating multiple or 
false profiles for citizens. Government alone can certify that someone is enfranchised for participating and 
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voting within its jurisdiction, and it has the legal ability to verify identities. The ability of users to speak or 
write online under a verified civic identity is a powerful reason for them to utilize and support civic 
technology under the control of government. We see this as one of the main selling points of a Democracy 
Machine engaging the public via privately controlled, commercial software. 
4 Deme: A Platform for All the Good Things in a Community 
The Deme (rhymes with “meme”) platform is an ongoing software project led by Davies, which began in 
2003 as a component of the Partnership for Internet Equity and Community Engagement (PIECE). PIECE 
joined together staff from the East Palo Alto Community Network with a team from Stanford University’s 
Symbolic Systems Program to do community-based research. PIECE aimed to enhance participation in the 
lower-income, ethnically and linguistically diverse community of East Palo Alto, near Stanford (Davies et 
al. 2002).  
 
Initially, Deme was created to address a common problem in the work of PIECE. Because of its status as a 
low-income city abutting much wealthier cities, East Palo Alto has periodically drawn investment from 
nearby foundations and corporations to build and support its community-serving organizations. Two such 
initiatives in the early 2000s were the Digital Village (funded by Hewlett Packard Company to bridge digital 
divides in East Palo Alto) and the One East Palo Alto neighborhood improvement initiative (funded by the 
Hewlett Foundation).  
 
In observing and doing surveys of the community as these initiatives unfolded, the PIECE researchers found 
residents’ ability to participate in decision making around these initiatives, and within community 
organizations themselves, was hampered by the requirement to attend face to face meetings. Key voices were 
missing, such as when decisions were made at a One East Palo Alto community forum that conflicted with 
an event focused on housing. These and other constraints on participation further undermined the perceived 
legitimacy of the initiative, and probably altered its priorities.  
 
As the Stanford design team reflected on the problems identified in East Palo Alto, an argument emerged for 
developing an online tool to help community members participate outside of in-person meetings. In addition 
to addressing the problem of attendance and participation in meetings, the team was motivated by other 
problems of community group engagement. These included the difficulty of making decisions in a timely 
way in face-to-face meetings, communication between meetings and between subgroups, making information 
available during and between meetings, and issues related to decision procedures and transparency (Davies 
et al. 2002). 
 
The tool designed to address these problems was initially called POD (Platform for Online Deliberation), and 
was then renamed Deme, after the neighborhood units that were composed to create democracy in ancient 
Athens. Deme was intended initially to counter the idea of a purely virtual community. Reflecting its name, 
Deme was designed for groups of people who lived in the same physical community and who had offline 
relationships. Design principles included the following (Davies et al. 2009): 
 
• Supportiveness. The platform should support the group overall, so that there is either an 
improvement or no decline in the ability of the group to meet the needs of its members or 
stakeholders.  
• Comprehensiveness. The platform should allow the group to accomplish, in an online environment, 
all of the usual deliberative tasks associated with face-to-face meetings. 
• Participation. The platform should maximize the number of desired participants in the group’s 
deliberations, and minimize barriers to their participation. 
• Quality. The platform should facilitate a subjective quality of interaction and decision making that 
meets or exceeds what the group achieves in face-to-face meetings. 
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The first version of Deme was created in 2003, a year before Facebook launched at the dawn of Web 2.0. At 
that time, users’ expectations for the Web were simpler and rooted in its early, less-interactive formats. The 
most popular Web forum tool in 2003 was Craigslist, which had a famously simple interface. This was still 
a time when one programmer (Brendan O’Connor) could create a tool that, within a summer, was usable and 
appealing to its initial users, while at the same time embodying more complex functionality than was 
available on Craiglist or any other widely used groupware on the Web at that time.  
 
As the Deme project developed in the ensuing five years, the Web changed quickly and dramatically. By the 
time the current version of Deme was coded by Mike Mintz in the Django framework in 2008, both the tools 
available for developing web applications and the user appeal of Web applications had improved to the point 
where it needed a large developer community to keep up with users’ expectations. The leader of a project 
with similar ambitions at UC Berkeley (Jerome Feldman) concluded that maintaining a usable Web 
application for groups had become an impossible task given the constraints on software development in a 
university environment (Thaw, Feldman, Li, and Caballe 2009). 
 
As Deme developed further toward its current incarnation, the team realized it needed to be a general purpose 
tool with full support for user profiles, events, news, photo collections, and other items, so that it would not 
be consigned to isolation (Davies & Mintz 2009). It gradually also became clear that for Deme to have a life 
outside of academic research, it would have to spin off into a revenue-generating product. The team, however, 
was committed to keeping the code free and open—never exploiting its users for profit. A model that was 
considered was to create a nonprofit for Deme as free software, but with a private company that would make 
money on premium hosting, a la Wordpress. At a university other than Stanford, where graduates with 
software skills are in such high demand, this might have been able to attract a critical number of skilled 
programmers. But there were many other projects such as the Diaspora team that tried to take on Facebook 
with a lot of gusto and still failed (Dwyer 2014).  
 
Software development is inherently difficult, and when functionality grows to encompass many users’ needs, 
the challenges of coordinating its development are so formidable that even well-funded and organized teams 
often fail (Rosenberg 2007). In 2003, the Deme team may have been misled by the relative ease of 
programming in the early days of the Web (and the rapid success of projects in those years that were the 
product of a single mind) into thinking that a boutique project could be useful for groups. Today, it is clear 
that building community and group-supporting software of this sort requires massive investment and lots of 
enthusiastic talent, as well as a large revenue base to support the infrastructure needed to maintain users and 
their data.  
 
The Web environment has become very complex, with security threats and patent infringement high on the 
list of challenges that were off the radar sixteen years ago. One option is to throw up our hands and leave it 
to the commercial market to create what we need. If we do that, we are likely to get something more useful 
for asynchronous online deliberation than we have today, and in fact there are now widely used tools that do 
at least part of what Deme envisioned in 2003 (e.g., Google Docs, Discord, Loomio, and Nextdoor—all but 
Loomio are proprietary). All of these tools, however, have significant limitations in comparison to what 
people can do in face-to-face gatherings, or even online synchronous meetings. None of them integrate well 
with people’s real identities and social networks, which is one of the (perhaps illusory) keys to Facebook’s 
success.  
 
In sum, the current set of online asynchronous deliberation tools is bifurcated into two broad options: (a) 
Facebook, which gives access to users’ identities and networks and is increasingly functional for groups, but 
comes with the baggage of Facebook’s attentional model, and (b) a panoply of more special-purpose tools 
that are not well integrated within a social network. Moreover, any privately controlled platform could shut 
down access to users’ data at any time—or perhaps sell the data to the Chinese government.  
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To address these dilemmas requires either peeling off a part of Facebook for noncommercial, privacy-
protecting use by civil society groups or building social network integration into new or existing tools for 
online deliberation. Either route will require very significant, ongoing funding, and a lot of trust by users. 
Even so, we see a viable strategy for bringing this into existence, and it involves appealing to the distinct 
motivations of different people who could build and use a new civil society toolkit. 
5 Leveraging the Distinct Motivations of Different Actors 
To understand the motivations that might lead different actors to bring about new digital tools, we explore 
further the first of our two examples—the Democracy Machine. In doing so, we hope to show how software 
and platforms of the kind we envision might be created. Designers cannot begin to refine and optimize an 
empowered online engagement system if the system itself does not exist. Though the limited success of 
systems like Consul is encouraging, we believe it is necessary to theorize more formally the ways in which 
key actors and entities could be motivated to build and sustain software for engagement with government. 
To this task, we now turn. 
5.1 Six Key Actors and Democratic Values 
In Table 1, we introduce the six different types of actors or entities that we have in mind. These include: (1) 
software producers that develop and operate social media infrastructure; (2) independent advocacy 
organizations, such as special interest groups and political parties; (3) nonpartisan organizations that promote 
democracy and deliberation; (4) the general public; (5) legislative, legal, and regulatory authorities; and (6) 
academic and nonpartisan research institutions. 
We present the first five of these actors in an order that parallels Yale political scientist Robert Dahl’s (1989) 
criteria for a democratic process to illustrate that the participation of these entities is not just a question of 
expediency but can be necessary to build up the democratic credentials of an online engagement system. As 
shown in Table 1, the software producers help with inclusion by facilitating access to social media sites where 
the public is already active. Advocacy organizations could help the Democracy Machine gradually gain more 
control over its agenda by pressuring government actors to put on the table controversial issues that these 
groups champion. The online discussion tools designed by nonpartisan civic groups could sustain deliberative 
procedures that give participants a more enlightened understanding of the issues before them. The public 
participants manifest effective participation if they use this system to ask questions, make arguments, and 
express their views. Finally, the government partners who empower this process give participants real 
influence with voting equality at the decisive stage of any public engagement or consultation. 
 
The sixth actor does not help to realize any of these five criteria directly. Nevertheless, including academic 
or nonpartisan professional researchers is essential because they can provide an independent evaluation of 
the performance of the Democracy Machine. Through experimentation and testing, they can also explain 
deficiencies in the system and test potential remedies. After all, this is the role that Dahl himself has played 
for modern democracies.  
5.2 On Motivations, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty 
Shortly, we have more to say about the specific role each actor plays, but first we attend to the motivations 
underlying their participation and to their ability to challenge or exit the process altogether. We juxtapose 
these considerations in the spirit of Hirschman’s (1970) theory of exit, voice, and loyalty. In this view, a 
system works well when its occupants have the power to exit but will stop short of doing so as long as they 
have a strong voice along with enough loyalty to the system to prevent impulsive departure.  
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Table 1: The values, interests, and independent power of six key actors 
collaborating on the implementation of a Democracy Machine. 
Actor/Entity 
Category Examples 
Primary Democratic 
Value Advanced  
Interest Served for 
Taking Part 
Ability to Question 
or Exit Process 
Software 
producers 
that develop 
and operate 
social media 
infrastructure 
Facebook, 
Wikimedia 
Foundation, 
Google, Mozilla, 
WhatsApp, 
HashiCorp 
Inclusion improved by 
gaining access to sites 
where the public is 
already active can 
participate easily 
Sharing its platform 
at reduced cost may 
forestall regulation 
Ability to decline 
renewal of a public 
contract permitting 
use of its platform 
Independent 
advocacy 
organizations 
Interest groups 
(e.g., Greenpeace) 
and political parties 
Control of the agenda 
eventually realized 
through advocacy  
Effective vehicle for 
advancing its agenda 
and arguments while 
mobilizing its 
membership 
Ability to mobilize 
against the process 
and question its 
utility or neutrality 
Nonpartisan 
organizations 
that promote 
deliberation 
League of Women 
Voters, National 
Institute for Civil 
Discourse, 
Kettering 
Foundation 
Enlightened 
understanding realized 
through deliberative 
procedures 
Unprecedented public 
relevance and 
visibility while 
fulfilling its core 
mission 
Ability to withdraw 
from process and 
discredit its 
democratic 
reputation 
Public 
participants 
in the process 
The population can 
be residents of a 
jurisdiction, an 
electorate, public 
service users, etc. 
Effective participation 
achieved if 
participants can ask 
questions, make 
arguments, and 
express their views 
Promotion of more 
representative and 
effective public 
policy and budgeting 
Ability to make the 
process politically 
inert by exiting the 
process or ignoring 
it altogether 
Legislative, 
legal, and 
regulatory 
authorities 
Any local, state, or 
federal agency, 
official, or body 
that has the 
authority to 
implement a policy 
recommendation 
Commitment to 
ensuring voting 
equality at the decisive 
stage by granting 
equal power to the 
participants 
Delegation of 
responsibility on 
intractable problems 
simultaneously 
avoids blame while 
gaining legitimacy 
via empowerment 
Ability to decline 
further participation 
in process, which 
would strip it of its 
core power and 
relevance 
Academic and 
nonpartisan 
research 
institutions 
Teams of 
university 
researchers and 
established 
research institutes 
(e.g., Pew Research 
Center) 
Provides an 
independent 
evaluation of 
performance on these 
criteria and explains 
shortfalls 
Access to valuable 
data that will advance 
theories of online 
public enngagement 
Critical independent 
evaluations could be 
deployed by critics 
to force process 
reform 
 
By analogy, in online multiplayer gaming, a competitive system forces each game developer to keep 
improving its world lest players exercise their option to exit it for an alternative play space. Meanwhile, 
giving players some voice over the world’s development can directly satisfy them and build up a modicum 
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of loyalty, such that they hesitate to rage-quit the game when the developers make a policy change that 
offends them (Madigan 2015). 
 
In Table 1, we show why each of the six key actors has good reasons to take part in building a Democracy 
Machine, but each also retains the ability to exit the system if necessary. For example, nonpartisan 
organizations that advocate democratic reform could join forces with this project to increase their visibility 
and relevance. All the while, they would retain the ability to withdraw from the process or—in an extreme 
case—use their own good name to discredit the Democracy Machine as failing to live up to its ideals. 
6 Embracing the Paradox of a Public Corporation 
To harness all these motivations, we propose the model of a public corporation—an entity authorized and 
funded by government that operates independently to fulfill a nonprofit mission. In the U.S., the most famous 
example is the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB), but there are similar subsidized broadcast 
corporations in other countries, notably the U.K. and Canada (Hilmes 2003, McChesney 2015). These have 
been tremendously successful in producing award-winning content that has earned large audiences, and the 
independence of these bodies has enabled them to provide content that boosts civic knowledge (O’Mahen 
2016). The CPB’s main function is to fund the production and distribution of programming that competes 
with the production and broadcast quality of commercial radio and television. As such, it provides an 
alternative to the advertising and subscription models of for-profit broadcasters and does so with a mission 
to serve the public interest. 
 
As mentioned previously, our proposed name for the software analogue of CPB is the Corporation for Public 
Software (CPS). The analogy with public broadcasting is instructive.2 As recounted by Tim Wu (2017), 
public broadcasting gained momentum in the U.S. in the 1960s after Americans had become disillusioned 
with commercial television. Vance Packard’s book The Hidden Persuaders (1957) topped the best seller list 
with its argument that TV advertising was operating subconsciously to influence viewers through subliminal 
messages. Edward R. Murrow left CBS News after his public affairs program See It Now was canceled in 
favor of lighter, more upbeat game shows that advertisers favored. Murrow became an apostate, saying that 
television “in the main insulates us from the realities of the world in which we live.” The quiz show and 
Payola scandals at the end of the 1950s exposed how television and radio broadcasters were deceiving their 
audiences. Corporations like Disney had created shows for the purpose of marketing products to children, 
and a powerful movement for more wholesome, educational programming for children developed with the 
leadership of Fred Rogers and the producers of Sesame Street. 
 
If one reads this history, it is not hard to see the parallels to our own time in the disillusionment that set in at 
the close of the 1950s. This was, of course, followed by the 1960s revolt against “commerce, conformism, 
and the power of advertising” (Wu 2017). And the Corporation for Public Broadcasting was created as part 
of that era, in 1967 (Hilmes 2003).  
 
Analogously to the CPB, a Corporation for Public Software would serve primarily as a funding vehicle. It 
would provide sufficient and stable funding to develop noncommercial software in the public interest that 
meets users’ expectations for the ease and functionality they get with well-financed social media platforms. 
Like the CPB, the CPS would need to disburse its funds astutely to meet the needs of a large majority of the 
public. The ability to deliver on that promise has protected and sustained CPB in the face of threats to its 
funding by members of Congress who might otherwise prefer to eliminate or drastically reduce it (Soha 2017, 
Baldridge 2018). But the CPB is just one part of the public broadcasting ecosystem, and it provides only a 																																																								
2	For	an	op-ed	that	makes	some	of	the	same	points	as	this	article,	see	Martin	(2019).	While	Martin’s	focus	appears	to	be	updating	government	policy	around	Public	Broadcasting	to	account	for	the	role	of	the	Internet	as	a	delivery	vehicle,	our	focus	is	more	broadly	on	funding	for	the	production	of	public	interest	software,	including	that	which	serves	public	media.	
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minority of the funding for the stations, networks, and productions it supports. A majority of the funding for 
public broadcasting comes from foundation grants, corporate underwriters, individual donors, and state and 
local entities (Lee 2012). Thus, the CPB has served (so far) as a stable anchor for a whole host of actors who 
jointly sustain public broadcasting.  
 
While the CPB acts primarily as a funding agency aimed at providing stability, public radio and television 
networks and distributors (e.g. NPR, PRI, PBS, and American Public Television) cultivate, vet, and provide 
programs for their member and affiliate stations. This model has succeeded to the extent that PBS has been 
named the most trusted media outlet in the U.S. for the past 16 years (Eggerton 2019). Analogously for public 
software, we envision one or more such intermediary organizations with their own governance structures 
serving to coordinate the production and distribution of public interest software to subscribing governments 
and civil society organizations. For schematic reference, we will refer to such an organization as a Public 
Service Distributor (PSD). 
 
A PSD makes sense in the pubic software ecosystem because it most readily connects each of the six key 
actors in Table 2, which spells out their relationships in the context of the Democracy Machine. In the 
broadest terms, a public service organization such as the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) earns its support 
from the CPB by serving the general public, and it also enters into collaborations with civic organizations 
(e.g., outreach programs) and academic institutions (e.g., research partnerships). Private entities also contract 
with PSDs to provide specific goods and services, often of a technical nature. Advocacy organizations may 
have the most tenuous tie to a PSD, but the relationship still exists, as these organizations often scrutinize, 
lobby, or celebrate the work of public corporations depending on how it affects the advocacy group’s agenda.  
Table 2 shows the ties that hold the different actors together. This includes formal contractual obligations, 
responsibilities, and resources that each actor provides, along with their primary means of influence over the 
PSD. For example, consider what might be the most non-obvious actor—the independent advocacy 
organizations. Some of these might enter into a contractual relationship with the PSD responsible for the 
Democracy Machine if other means fail to recruit members of the community such an organization 
represents. This would be analogous to the outreach that civic organizations sometimes do to reach 
disenfranchised social groups that require special recruitment methods. The influence of these groups 
depends on their existing advocacy prowess, which they will use to influence the corporation’s agenda or the 
content it produces. In turn, these organizations are expected to encourage participation by their membership; 
if such organizations choose to remain outside the public corporation’s engagement efforts, they will have 
little voice within it. Finally, in addition to expanding the user base for the corporation’s online activities, 
advocacy groups lend political power to its recommendations by publicizing outcomes that they view as 
favorable.  
7 For Those Who Haven’t Succumbed to Despair, Start Here 
Building anything like a Democracy Machine or a full realization of the Deme platform will require 
tremendous effort, but there are plausible pathways to such an undertaking. After all, governments and civic 
reforms have joined forces before to bring into existence many new forms of deliberation and participation 
(Nabatchi and Leighninger 2015). And in the digital realm, an abundance of civic technologies have emerged 
(Gordon and Mihailidis 2016; Noveck 2015), with the Consul example in Spain standing out as an effort of 
digital civic engagement that already has a sizable price tag but sufficient use and diffusion to warrant a 
continued investment (Peña-López 2017; Smith 2018). 
 
It is our contention that future efforts should build on these past successes—and avoid the more frequent 
failures in digital democracy innovation—by developing a new public corporation for noncommercial 
software. This vehicle should help bring together the different actors necessary to make such a venture 
successful, while providing a secure foundation on which to grow. Indeed, the spark for this may come from 
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any of the actors we mentioned, whether from legislative action, a philanthropic investment, or platform of 
a major political party, or elsewhere.  
Table 2: Contractual ties, means of influence, responsibilities, and contributions of 
six key actors in relation to a Democracy Machine’s public service distributor 
(PSD). 
Actor/Entity 
Category 
Contractual Ties 
to Public Service 
Distributor 
Primary Influence on 
Public Service 
Distributor 
Responsibility 
within Public 
Service Distributor 
Primary Resource 
Contributions 
Software 
producers 
that develop 
and operate 
social media 
infrastructure 
Licensing of 
software and 
platform access 
and granting 
inspection of code 
May negotiate future 
service contracts 
Providing access to 
its platform, 
encouraging user 
engagement, and 
regular usage reports 
Discounted access, 
plus profit sharing if 
hosting the public 
process generates 
new revenue 
Indepdendent 
advocacy 
organizations 
Potential contracts 
for recruiting from 
underserved 
populations 
May advocate for 
future agenda items 
and collaborate on 
developing content 
Encouragement of 
participation by 
organizational 
membership 
Adds political 
power through 
expansion of user 
base and publicizing 
outcomes of process 
Nonpartisan 
organizations 
that promote 
deliberation 
Contracts for 
designing and 
overseeing 
deliberative tools 
Occupies a limited 
number of seats on 
Board of Directors 
Ensures quality of 
deliberative tools and 
reports on process 
integrity 
Staff and volunteer 
tool designers, 
facilitators, and 
process monitors 
Public 
participants 
in the process 
Primary owner of 
the corporation 
Stratified random 
sample of users hold 
majority of seats on 
Board of Directors 
Oversight of process 
development and 
negotiating issue 
agenda with govt. 
Adds political 
power through 
participation, plus 
voluntary donations  
Legislative, 
legal, and 
regulatory 
authorities 
Makes public 
commitments to 
implement or give 
substantive 
responses to 
recommendations 
Occupies a limited 
number of seats for 
Board decisions 
pertaining to its scope 
of authority 
Negotiation of policy 
and budget agenda 
with the Board to 
initiate new processes 
Authorizes the 
degree of direct 
influence the 
process has on 
public budgets or 
policies; subsidizes 
operational costs 
Academic and 
nonpartisan 
research 
institutions 
Enters contractual 
relationship to 
obtain data access, 
implement 
experiments, and 
provide reports 
Detailed empirical 
reports can influence 
future design of 
process and authorize 
new experiments 
Regular independent 
evaluations of 
process quality and 
oversight of internal 
grants and data 
access 
Volunteer and low-
cost student and 
faculty research 
labor, plus external 
research contracts 
and grants 
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